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In the Supreme Court 
of the State o£.1Jfah" F~ I 
APR 29 1948 
~E\YELL J. OLSEN, oper-
ating under the name and 
style of NE\YELL J. OLSEN 
& SONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLAND A. REESE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
-------- .... - - --------- ----------
CLERK, SUPREME OOURl, UTM 
Appellant's 
Brief 
Appeal from the Di~trict Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for the 
County of Cache. 
lion. lVIarriner M. Morrison, Judge. 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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In the Supretne Court 
of the State of Utah 
NEWELL J. OLSEN, oper-
ating under the name and 
style of NE\\'ELL J. OLSEN 
& SONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLAND A. REESE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Appellant's 
Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal 
and from an order sustaining defendant's demurrer 
(\vnich had long since been overruled, to plaintiff's 
complaint, and from the- trial court's summary order 
dismissing plaintiff's cause of action and discharging 
the jury from further consideration of the case. 
Appellant originally brought this suit in the city 
court against respondent for a balance of $521.00, 
alleged to be due and owing to plaintiff for labor and 
materials supplied in the construction of a basement 
apartment for respondent in his residence. The con-
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tract between the parties is in writing and is set out 
in the complaint. It states ten specific items which 
plaintiff, as second party, agreed to do (plaintiff to 
furnish work and materials), and then the contract 
continues. 
"Any additional work shall be paid for by 
first party as parties hereto shall later agree 
upon. Any alterations shall be paid for by first 
party as extra work. Second party shall also 
furnish all hardware and shall do all work in a 
good and workmanlike manner." 
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he car-
ried out and performed all of the ten specific items 
set out in the contract (except the wooden floor, which 
was unavailable, for which the parties agreed upon a 
credit of $150.00). Plaintiff further CJ.Heged that in 
addition to the stated items in the contract, he did, at 
defendant's request, much additional work and per-
formed many alterations which are specifically stated 
and set out in the complaint. Paragraph five of the 
complaint reads: 
"That the total cost and exr>€nse of all of 
the said extra items as above enumerated 
to $601.00, which together with the balance of 
$995.00 due on contract as above stated, mal<:.es 
a total amount due plaintiff for said construction 
work for defendant of $1,596.00, of which defend-
.~mt has paid only the sum of $1,075.00, leaving a 
balance of $521,00, now due and owing the plain-
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i) 
"\\TIEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment 
against defendant for said sum of $521.00, to-
gether with costs of court." 
Defendant filed a general demurrer m the city 
court. but claimed nothing for it. His demurrer was 
overruled, of which notice was duly given. The de-
fendant then filed his answer. In it he admitted 
execution of contract as alle·ged; admitted that he 
had paid the plaintiff the sum of $1,075.00, but denied 
the other allegations of the complaint. Then the 
answer continues : 
"BY WAY OF FURTHER ANSvVER AND 
AS A FURTHER DEFENSE. the defendant 
alleges that plaintiff did not do the work con-
tracted in a workmanship manner and failed to 
perform certain work and labor and furnish 
material alleged in the plaintiff's contract; that 
on the 21st day of August, 1946, the plaintiff 
and the defendant went over all the items and 
work performed by the plaintiff and the defend-
ant paid the plaintiff a balance of $500.00 as a 
complete and final settlement of all the con~ 
troversies between the parties hereto." 
Defendant appealed from the judgment rendered 
against him in the city court. In the district court 
defendant moved and was granted leave to file an 
Amended Answer in which he amplifies his Further 
Answer and Further Defense, and specifically alleges: 
"That the said contract sets forth that the 
plaintiff should do the work in a good and work-
manship manner; that the defendant was to 
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furnish all first class material, furnishing all 
necessary labor and materials, exclusive of 
plumbing and wiring; and that the finishing of 
the rock wall and sheet rock is not in accordance 
with the contract and was installed in a poor 
workmanship manner. That the rock wall that 
was torn down was never replaced and was left 
in an unfinished condition; that the bedroom 
windows leak · and were not installed in a work~ 
manship manner and the hanging of doors and 
other work was not done in a workmanship 
manner, all to the damage of the· defendant in 
the sum of $450.00." 
Plaintiff filed a Reply to said Further Answer 
denying that the $500.00 check was delivered to 
plaintiff or accepted by plaintiff as full settlement; 
denied the allegations of poor workmanship: 
"Plaintiff denies that the defendant suf-
fered the sum of $450.00 or any sum whatsoever 
on account of alleged poor workmanship or de-
fective materi,al, but alleges that he, the plain-
tiff, did his work in a reasonable and workman 
like manner and with as good material as was 
av~ilable and as plaintiff could buy on the market 
at said time. Plaintiff denies all other allega-
tions in said further answer not herein admitted 
or qualified." 
On the 20th day of March, 1948, a jury was duly 
impanneled to try the above case. After statement 
to the jury by court and respective counsel, plaintiff 
was duly sworn and testified in his own behalf. After 
testifying that he carried out and performed all of 
the specific items of construction stated in the con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
tract, he further testified that in addition he did, at 
defendant's request, a considerable amount of extra 
work (Tr. 29) as follows : 
(a) Plaintiff put in a French door in place 
of common door (Tr. 30), actual extra cost, 
$6.00, ',\·hich he charged. 
(b) Plaintiff built and installed dinette cab-
i:~et and small cabinet in kitchen in place of 
dinette counter (Tr. 31), actual extra ccst, $50.00, 
which he charged. 
(c) Plaintiff installed a small built-in book 
case, including casing and painting the same. 
(Tr. 33), cost $15.00, which he chm:gcd as extra. 
(d) Plaintiff built and installed a large 
linen closet in place of an ordinary clothes closet 
(Tr. :14), cost ~50.00, which he charged as extra. 
(e) Plaintiff built and installed one addi-
tional linen closet (Tr. 35), cost $40.00, which he 
charged as extra. 
(f) Plaintiff built entrance into washroom, 
cement steps, side walls, etc., at a cost of $125.00, 
which he charged as extra. (Tr. 36). 
(g) Plaintiff cut cement wall and built and 
installed double window in southeast bedroom 
(Tr. 36), cost $50.00, wrich he charged as extra. 
(h) Plaintiff constructed cement window 
wells, (Tr. 37), cost $30.00, which he charged as 
extra. 
(i) Plaintiff replaced cement floor in 
kitchen, and washroom, sheet-rocked and painted 
hallway, etc., (Tr. 39). cost $200.00, which he 
charged as extra. 
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(j) Plaintiff varnished sheet-rock before 
papering, (Tr. 40), cost $10.00, which he charged 
as extra. 
(k) Plaintiff installed base boards on entire 
basement, (Tr. 40), cost $2,5.00, which he charged 
as extra. 
Plaintiff testified that these extra items totaled 
$601.00; that considering what had been paid 
($1,075.00), there was still due and owing to the 
plaintiff, a balance of $521.00 (Tr. 41). 
Thus it will be seen that the defendant had ac-
tually paid the amount in full due under the written 
contract,-for the ten specific items therein set forth, 
-and in addition $80.00 on the $601.00 due for extra 
work and alterations; leaving a balance of $521.00, still 
due and owing to the plaintiff for said extra work and 
materials. 
On ·cross-examination, (Tr. 42), counsel did not 
question plaintiff on his testimony given on direct 
examination, but commenced asking appellant if he 
was a licensed contractor at the time the contract was 
signed. Appellant answered, "Yes, sir, I was licensed, 
as can be verified by the State." Then counsel asked 
appellant when ,he took out his license. Witness an-
swered, ''I don't recall." We objected to this line of 
cross-examination as it was outside the issues. (Tr. 43). 
MR. DAINES: I demurred to the complaint, 
Mr. Fonnesbeck, on a general demurrer. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
THE COURT. · Objection overruled. 
Then proceedings took place, in which the court 
summarily sustained defendant's demurrer and dis-
missed plaintiff's case. (Tr. 43 to 53.) 
ASSIGNJIENT OF ERRORS 
ERROR NO. 1. The court erred in overruling 
plaintiff's objection and in permitting defendant's 
counsel, on cross-examination, to question plaintiff as 
to whether he had a contractor's license at the time 
the· contract was signed. (Tr. 43) 
ERROR NO. 2. The court erred in sustaining 
defendant's demurrer which had previously been over-
ruled, without any prior notice or motion to reinstate 
the demurrer or any notice that defendant claimed 
anything under his demurrer (long since overruled). 
(Tr. 47) 
ERROR NO. 3. The court erred in holding 
that as a condition precedent to the bringing of an 
action or to the stating of a cause of action, that the 
plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he was at 
the time of the contract a licensed contractor. 
(Tr. 47) 
ERROR NO. 4. The court erred in holding, 
apriori, that plaintiff was a contractor, and that he 
was not a licensed contractor, when those questions 
. 
were in dispute, the plaintiff having testified as to the 
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extra work done for which he was sueing, and that 
he was licensed, and an issue of fact had thus been 
raised on those questions on which plaintiff was en-
titled to go to the jury. 
ERROR NO. 5. The court erred in stating to 
counsel for defendant, "If you make a motion to dis-
miss, I'll grant it." 
ERROR NO. 6. The court erred in dismissing the 
plaintiff's case as follows: 
"The record may show that the case is dis-
missed on the grounds that the plaintiff has 
failed to prove that at the time of the execution 
of this agreement that he was a licensed con-
tractor of the State of Utah .and upon the further 
ground that the complaint does not state a cause 
of action." (Tr. 52). 
ERROR NO. 7. The court erred in making and 
entering its . Judgment of Dismissal of said cause. 
ARGUMENT 
(A) PLEADING AND PROCEDUHE 
I desire first to discuss the questions here involved, 
from the standpoint of pleadings and procedure,-the 
necessity of pleadings to raise the question here pre-
sented, to-wit: did the plaintiff have a contractor's 
license? 
It will be noted that the defendant's general de-
J 
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murrer had long since been overruled; that the defend-
ant had claimed nothing for it. It had been filed 
simply as a time demurrer, so far as court or counsel 
for plaintiff were advised. 
It will also be noted that after defendant appealed 
to the district court from the judgment rendered for 
the plaintiff in the city court, that he filed an amended 
answer, in which he amplified all of his defenses to 
plaintiff's cause of action, but pleaded no def~llBe 
whatsoever based on the ground that plaintiff did not 
have a contractor's license. 
That was a defense (if it existed) which de-
fendant kept to himself and it. was sprung as a sur-
prise and as an "ace in the hole", by which defendant 
apparently hoped to (and in fact did) score a knockout, 
a dismissal of plaintiff's case, without meeting the 
issues on the merits. If counsel answers that he did 
not learn about that defense himself until a few days 
before the trial, the answer is that he knew about it 
in plenty of time to advise or serve notice on plain-
tiff's counsel that such a defense would be made at 
the trial. But had defendant so notified plaintiff, the 
surprise element would have been lost, for plaintiff 
would then have been prepared to meet that defense. 
Our Statute, Section 104-29-2, requires that a 
judgment must be on the merits of a case. except 
in the specific cases of judgment of dismissal or non-
suit, provided for in Section 104-29-1. It is respect-
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fully submitted that the judgment of dismissal entered 
herein was error, for it does not come within any of 
the provisions of Section 104~29-1. 
''Pleadings are intended to form the foundation 
of the proof to be submitted on the trial, and should 
advise the parties to an action what the opposite party 
relies upon either as a cause of action or defense or 
objection as the case may be." (31 Cyc. 43-4.) 
It is submitted that the underlying thought back 
of the above rule and the sections of our statute, 
regulating pleadings and court procedure, is to avoid 
surprises and have all suits and actions of litigants, 
so far as possible, tried and settled on their merits. 
To this same e:qd, to avoid surprises and misun-
derstandings, Section 104~9-1 specifically provides 
what the Answer must contain by way of defense to 
plaintiff's complaint. Thus: 
"The answer of the defendant must contain: 
( 1) A general or specific denial of each 
material allegation of the complaint controverted 
by the defendant, or any knowledge .or infor-
mation thereof sufficient to form a belief; or a 
specific admission or denial of some of the al-
legations of the complaint, and also a general 
denial of all the allegations of the. complaint not 
specifically admitted or denied in the answer. 
(2) A statement of any new matter consti-
tuting a defense or counter~claim." 
These statutory and well established court rules 
J 
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and regulations should, I submit, be kept in mind 
when determining proper procedure under Section 
79-5a-l, requiring contractors to take out a license. 
That Section (79-5a-1) provides: "It shall be 
unlawful for any person ... to engage in the business 
or act in the capacity of a contractor without having· 
a license therefor as herein provided." 
lt will be noted that there is no statutory pro-
vision providing that a contract entered into by an 
unlicensed contractor shall be void. Neither are there 
any statutory provision stating that an unlicensed con-
tractor may not bring suit or may not recover on his 
contract, or may not bring action to recover for the 
reasonable value of services rendered,-for the labor 
and material furnished and supplied by plaintiff, of 
which defendant has had the use and benefit. The 
statute merely makes the act of engaging in business 
as a contractor-undertaking to do definite construc-
tion work for a fixed price,-without a license, malum 
prohibitum. 
\Nithout any pleadings or notice by defendant 
(other than a general demurrer for which nothing was 
at that time claimed), the trial court took the position 
that the question of plaintiff having a license might 
be raised at any time. and that a contract entered into 
by an unlicensed contractor (thereby assuming and 
impliedly finding- that plaintiff was a contractor and 
that he was unlicensed) was wholly void. That as a 
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condition precedent to the stating of a cause of action 
by the plaintiff, it was necessary and mandatory that 
plaintiff allege that he was a licensed contractor. And, 
as the plaintiff had not so alleged in his complaint, 
the trial court considered the plaintiff's case fatal and 
irreparable, and not only sustained the general de-
murrer (previously overruled), but .ordered the case to 
be dismissed, and thereafter, on March 30, 1948, made 
and entered its Judgment of Dismissal of said case. 
Appellant submits that such arbitrary rulings and 
judgment were gross injustice and constitute revers-
able error. That inasmuch as the statute does not de-
clare that a contract by an unlicensed contractor is 
void or uinf.orceable, nor that an unlicensed contractor 
may not recover for work performed or for materials 
supplied, that plaintiff's contract was valid ansi his 
complaint stated a cause of action. 
Appellant submits that if defendant claimed a 
defense on the ground that plaintiff had no contrac-
tor's license, it was his duty in view of the provisions 
of our statute, to plead such defense, or, by special 
demurrer or motion, raise such defense. 
Appellant further submits that the rulings and 
judgment of dismissal by the trial court imposed pen-
alties and hardships on the plaintiff, not required or 
contemplated by the statutes here involved, Sections 
79-5a-1,-10. Appellant contends that as said statutes 
are penal in their nature and are a restriction on the 
J 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff's civil rights, they should be strictly con-
strued; that the court should not go beyond the clear 
expressed intent of the statute, particularly when the 
nature of the business here involved (work and ma-
terials furnished by plaintiff in the construction of an 
apartment), is considered. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the better 
and more modern rule is that when a person engages . 
in business such as contractor, without first procur-
ing the license, (assuming plaintiff had done so which 
we do not admit), which the statute requires for the 
privilege of doing such work, he incurs the penalties 
which the statute in such case provides, and none 
other. That if further penalty or hardship are to be 
imposed for doing such act (furnishing, or undertak-
ing to furnish, work and materials as a contractor), 
which the Legislature has made malum prohibitum, 
if done without a license, then such additional penalty 
should be imposed by the statutes, through the Legis-
lature and not by the courts. 
In the annotation on this question, 118 A.L.R. 646, 
we read. 
"In a considerable number of the recent cases, 
stress or reliance appears to be placed upon the 
absence of any specific provision declaring void or 
unenforceable the contract of an unlicensed per-
son. See, for example, John E. Rosasco Cream-
eries v. Cohen (N. Y.) (reported herewith), and 
also other cases set out under headings "Food 
dealers" and ''Liquor dealers", infra. And it 
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was stated, arguendo, in Patterson vs. Southern 
R. Co. (1938) 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364, that 
the trend of authority was to the effect that 
'when a person engages in a business without pro-
curing the license which the state requires for 
the privilege,' he incurs the penalties whiCh the 
statutes pertaining to the license provide, and 
none other." 
In the Rosasco case, the New York Court uses this 
language: 
"We have here a statute which provides that 
milk dealers shall not sell milk unless duly 
licensed. The statute imposes penalties for its 
violation by way of fine and imprisonment, b:1t 
it does not expressly provide that contracts 
made by milk dealers shall be unenforceable. 
Nothing in this statute reveals an implied intent 
to deprive unlicensed dealers of the right to re-
cover the reasonable value of the milk sold by 
them, and where the wrong committed by the 
violation of the statute is merely mah~m 
prohibitum, and does not endanger health or mor-
als, such additional punishment should not b8 
.imposed unless the legislative intent is expressed 
or appears by clear· implication ... Illegal con-
tracts are generally unenforceable. Where 
contracts which violate statutory provisions are 
merely malum prohibitum, the general rule 
does not .always apply. If the statute does not 
provide expressly that its violation will deprive 
the parties of their right to su3 on the con-
tract, and the denial of relief is wholly out of 
proportion to the requirements of public policy 
or appropriate individual punishment, the right 
to recover will not be denied." 
J 
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In the Rosasco case, the New York statute pro-
vided: 
''Section 257. Licenses to milk dealers. No 
milk dealer shall buy milk from producers or 
others or deal in, handle, sell or distribute milk 
unless such dealer be duly licensed as provided 
in this article. lt shall be unlawful for a milk 
dealer to buy milk from or sell milk to a milk 
dealer who is unlicensed, or in any way deal 
in or handle milk which he has reason to be~ 
lieve has previously been dealt in or handled 
in violation of the provisions of this chapter." 
Thus the ~ ew York statute was very similar ill 
its provisions to our statute 79-5a-1. The penalty fo1 
violation of each of said statutes is almost identical. 
In the Rosasco case. the defendant pleaded as an 
affirmative defense that plaintiff was not licensed as 
a milk dealer during the period when it sold milk to 
the defendant. 
That, we submit, is the proper rule of pleading 
and procedure in cases of this kind, where the statute 
does not make the contract void, nor prohibits recov-
ery if done without a license. The plaintiff's under-
taking as contractor (building a basement apartment), 
not being declared void by statute, and considenng our 
housing shortage, certainly could not be said to be 
·against, or in violation of public policy; nor can it be 
claimed that the statute was enacted as a police 
measure. 
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In the case of Garwin vs. Gordon, 14 Pac. 2nd 
264 (N.M.), an unlicensed real estate broker sued for 
the balance of his commission alleged to be due him. 
Judgment was entered in his favor by the trial court. 
Appellant contended that plaintiff in that case was 
= not entitled to judgment because he had failed to show 
-he was in possession of a broker's license. The New 
··Mexico Supreme Court, although observing that as a 
general rule brokers who fail to take out a license in 
violation of statute cannot recover a commission, yet 
in view of the fact that the New Mexico statute fails 
to provide that a broker's contract for sale of real 
estate is void, or that an unlicensed broker may not 
recover for services rendered, said : , 
''We hold that a broker regularly engaged 
in the business as an occupation, at least unless 
the transaction is shown to have occurred at a 
time when its commission constitutes ,q misde-
meanor (30 days after notice from th~ assessor), 
may recover compension for a sale effected when 
he was without such license." 
If we are correct in our analysis and contention 
as to pleading and procedure in these cases, then we 
submit the complaint herein did state a cause of 
action, and that the court erred in permitting counsel, 
over our objection, to question plaintiff on cross ex-
amination (without any previous notice or pleading) 
whether he had a contractor's license. 
And the court likewise erred in sustaining the 
general demurrer (which had long since been over-
J 
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ruled and fo1· which nothing had been claimed at the 
time) , and likewise erred in dismissing the plaintiff's 
case. 
(B) DEFENSE NOT AVAILABLE 
TO DEFENDANT 
Appellant further maintains that said judgment 
of dismissal and said rulings of the court here com-
plained of, we~e error for the claimed defense of 
invalidity of contract, and are not available as a 
defense to defendant in case at bar. because: 
(1) Plaintiff's suit to collect the balance due 
him of $521.00, is not based on the written contract; 
but it is a suit on a quantum merit basis for the extra 
work and materials, as set forth in the complaint and 
testified to by plaintiff, furnished and supplied in each 
instance by the plaintiff at the defendant's in;;tance 
and request, in addition to the items stated in the 
contract. Hence the argument of invalidity of said 
contract dated March 20th (because no license was 
issued to plaintiff until lVIarch 22nd), has no applica-
tion to and does not effect plaintiff's right to recover 
the reasonable value for the extra work and mater-
ials p2rformed and supplied by plaintiff in addition 
to the contract, (and after license had been issued to 
plaintiff). 
(2) Appellant submits that defendant is furth-
Prmore precluded and estopped from asserting or con-
tendi"!lp: that the contract set forth in the complaint 
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is void, for the reason that the defendant has pleaded 
and asserted a portion of said contract as part of his 
defense to the plaintiff's action ;-an alleged failure on 
the part of the plaintiff to perform his work "in a 
good and workmanlike manner as provided in the 
contract". Defendant admits that said contract was 
duly executed. The defendant is thus relying upon 
and asserting a provision of the said contract as his 
defense to the plaintiff's action, to-wit: the provision 
in the said contract that ·~second party shall do all 
work in a good and workmanlike manner"; which de-
fendant alleged plaintiff failed to do. :Qefendant should 
not be permitted to assert or claim that the contract 
is void because entered into by the plaintiff without 
a contractor's license, and at the same time admit 
the contract and set up provisions of the same as a 
defense to plaintiff's action, when plaintiff seeks to 
recover for work. and materials· furnished under said 
contract. And certainly, he should not be permitted 
to do so when the plaintiff is seeking to recover on a 
quantum merit basis for extra work and materials 
supplied by the plaintiff at the defendant's request, in 
addition to the provisions of the contract. 
{C) COURT ERRED IN ENTERING .JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL \VITHOUT GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND 
HIS COMPLAINT 
Appellant further contends that even though this 
Court should hold that plaintiff was · duty bound to 
J 
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allege in his complaint that he was the holder of a 
contractor's license "at the time he engaged in the 
business or acted in the capacity of a contractor", that 
the complaint did not state a cause of action without 
such allegation, that the question whether plaintifi 
held a contractor'::;; license could be raised at any time, 
even under a demurrer (for which defendant claimed 
nothing at the time and which had long since been 
overruled), and that the court pruperly sustained such 
demurrer; appellant contends that the trial court still 
erred in dismissing plaintiff's case and entering judg-
ment of dismissal without granting plaintiff leav~ to, 
amend his complaint. 
In this respect, case at bar· is very similar to the 
recent case of Smith v. American P~cking Company, 
130 P. 2nd 951, where the lower court .sustained de~ 
murrer to the COJI!plaint on the ground that it did not 
a;ppear that plaintiff had an architect's license; the 
court holding that plaintiff was sueing for services 
rendered as an architect. 
In the Smith case, no permission was granted 
plaintiff to amend· his complaint and the trial court 
entered judgment 0'1 the demurrer dismissing plain-
tiff~s case, in the same manner as the trial court 
sustained the de~urrer and dismissed the plantiff's 
action in case at bar. This Court held in the Smith 
case, that although the demurrer to the complaint 
was properly sustained (for S'pecial reasons which 
V'is Court there observed), th8 trial court erred in 
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entering its judgment of dismissal of the case without 
granting leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint. 
Appellant submits that the same error was made in 
the case at bar, even though, as stated, this Court 
should hold that the demurrer was properly sustained. 
In the Smith case, supra, tpis Court made a 
couple of observations which we think have applica-
tion to case at bar: 
(a) This Court said. "The purpose and intent 
of statute under consideration have a direct bearing 
regarding the sufficiency of the allegations of the 
complaint." Appellant submits that that rule should 
apply in· construing the sufficie:p.cy of the allegations 
of the complaint, in case at bar, and in reaching the 
conclusion that plaintiff's com'Plaint did state a cause 
of action, without affirmatively alleging that the 
plaintiff had a contractor's license. That this is so 
not only because this is a suit on quantum merit, but 
also because the statute does not provide that plain-
tiff's contract is void, or that the plaintiff, as a con-
tractor, may not recover for work performed aml 
materials supplied without a license. 
(b) In the Smith case, this Court further 
observed: 
"As a general rule where a person seeks 
recovery for professional services for which a 
J 
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license is required as a condition precedent to 
the rendition of such services for a fee, such 
person must allege and prove facts which show 
he was licensed at the time such se·rvices were 
rendered." 
We do not think that general statement should 
control all. cases where statute requires a license, ir-
respective of whether or not the statute provides• that 
no action may be brought, or no recovery may be had 
by the plaintiff, if he held no license. In support of 
the last quoted statement, this Court ci,tcs two 
cases,-Westbrook vs. Nelscm, 67 Pac. 884 (Kan.), and 
Hoxey vs. Ba~er, 246 N.\~T. 653 (Ia.). In the Kansas 
case the plaintiff, a physician, was sueing for services 
rendered. _The statute provided that ''In no case shall 
::my person violating this act receive compensation for 
services rendered." The Kansas Court held that the 
plaintiff had to allege b. his complaint, in order to 
state a cause of action, that he held a physician's 
license. The Iowa case, supra, was likewise a physician 
sueing for services rendered and the Iowa Court like-
wise held that under the statute requiring that . a 
person who practices medicine must obtain a license, 
and denying the right to_ sue for services rendered 
without a license, a person who practices medicine 
without a license cannot recover compensation- for 
such services rendered, and that the plaintiff must 
allege and prove that he is a licensed physician. 
Hence, we submit that the general statement 
made by this Court in the Smith case (to the effect 
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he was licensed at the time services were rendered), 
should be held to apply to cases where the statute 
requires a license as a condition precedent to the 
collection for services rendered, but it is not con-
tr0lling and should not be held to apply to case at 
bar where the statute has not made the issuance of 
a license to a contractor, a condition precedent to the 
contractor recovering for labor or materials furnished 
by him as a contractor without a contractor's license. 
In case at bar the plaintiff is not sueing for a fee, 
nor for personal services rendered. This suit is brought 
for work performed and materials furnished to de-
fendant, but for which he now seeks to avoid payment 
on the technicality that plaintiff did said work and 
furnished said materials without a license. Hence 
this case is much like the Rosasco milk· case, supra, 
where the New York Court held that in the absence 
()f statute prohibiting an action by a contractor, or 
prohibiting any recovery for milk sold without a 
license, the plaintiff could sue for and was entitled 
to recover for th~ milk actually sold and delivered by 
him, even without a license. 
Case at bar is also similar to the case of Rock 
Island Lumber & Coal Company vs. E. A. Wales Mill 
· Co., 212 Pac. 97 (Kan.), where it was held that 
failure on the part of a lumber dealers to comply with 
an ordinance imposing a license on such dealer and 
subjecting those who fail to take out a license to a 
:fine; the Kansas Court said: 
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"It does not, in terms or by necessary im-
plication, make it unlawful for a lumber and 
coal dealer to sell his wares in case of omission 
to pay the tax, the penalty is imposed for neglect 
to . pay the tax before engaging in business, and, 
paraphrasing the concluding portion of the opin-
ion in Simmons v. Oatman, by weight of more 
recent authority and by the better reason, the 
fact that the plaintiff had not paid $10 license 
fee is not available to the defendant to defeat an 
otherwise valid lien for material furnished to 
improve his property. 
''The judgment of the district court is reversed, 
and the cause is remanded for further proceed~ 
ings." 
In the Lumber Company case, supra, the Kansas 
Court reviews a number of earlier cases from that 
state, quoting from the case of Manker v. Tough, 98 
P. 792 (Kan.), as follows: 
"'Vhy should one party to a contract b2 
allowed to avoid the payment of debts he has 
contracted to pay, and thus gain an unconscion~ 
able advantage, because the other party delib-
erately, or through inability or mere oversight, 
has failed to discharge an obligation to the city, 
when there is available to the city both a civil 
remedy for the wrong and a penal remedy 
against the wrongdo2r? Was it any benefit to 
the city in Yount v. Denning, supra, that one 
party was reljeved from paying the other an agreed 
compensation for services actually rendered, or 
in Mayer v. Hartman, supra, that one party was 
enabled to cheat his neighbor out of coal worth 
nearly $1.000 ?" 
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We submit the same questiran could be asked in 
case at bar. Why should the defendant be allowed 
to avoid payment of'his just debt which he has agreed 
to pay1 either by express contract or by implied agree-
ment, and thus gain an unconscionable advantage over 
the plaintiff, because (as claimed by defendant) 
plaintiff did not have his contractor's license issued to 
him until two days after the contract was signed, but 
that he had it during the whole period while said 
work was done? 
(D) THE COURT ERRED IN DECIDING 
QUESTIONS OF FACT AWAY FROM THE 
JURY, AND IN ARBITRARILY RULING ON 
SAID DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT, AND 
IN HOLDNG, APRIORI, THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS A CONTRACTOR AND WAS UNLICENS-
ED, 'VHEN THE UNDISPIUTED EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED WAS TO THE CONTRAR,Y, OR AT 
-j> LEAST WHEN SAID QUESTIONS WERE IN 
DISPUTE. 
\Vas plaintiff sueing, in case at bar, as a con-
tractor'? Did the plaintiff have a contractor's license? 
The trial court, by dismissing plaintiff's case, in effect 
held and decided both of those two important ques-
tions of fact adverse to the plaintiff, even though a 
jury had been duJ.y sworn and impanneled to try the 
case and had in fact heard part of the evidence. 
(1) Appellant's first contention under this 
heading, is, that as there is undisputed evidence in 
the record, indicating a coutrary conclusion to that 
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arrived at by the trial court, the plaintiff was at least 
entitled to have both of tho~e questions of fact sub~ 
mitted to and decided by the jury, if the ('OUrt deemed 
that a decision thereon was necessary in order for 
plaintiff to recover. 
(2) Appellant contends that the court erred in 
holding, in effect, that plaintiff was sueing as a con-
tractor. It is true that plaintiff sets forth the con-
tract in· his complaint and alleges that he carried out 
and completed all of the items specified in the con-
tract. But the plaintiff also alleged that defendant 
had paid the sum of $1,075.00, which (considering the 
credit of $150.00, on account of flooring) paid the 
contract in full and $80.00 over, to be applied on the 
extra work and materials furnished by plaintiff. This 
extra work was done as the work under the contract 
progressed, and in each instance it was done at de-
fendant's instance and request. 
The plaintiff not only alleged in his complaint the 
various and specific items of the said extra work, but 
he also specifically testified to each item of said extra . 
work and alterations. That he had performed the 
same, in each instance at defendant's request. Also 
the reasonable and fair value of said extra work and 
material ordered by defendant and for which defend~ 
ant thereby impliedly promised and agreed to pay. 
Hence it will be seen that what plaintiff was and is 
sueing for is the balance $521.00, still due the plaintiff 
as the reasonable value of said extra work and ma-
terials so furnished. 
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That being true, can it be said he is sueing as a 
contractor? We think not. Section 79-5a·3 defines 
a contractor as follows: 
''79-5a-3. Contractor Defined. A con .. 
tractor is a person . . . who for a fixed sum, price 
or fee, undertakes with another for the con. 
struction, alteration, repair of any building ... 
or any part thereof." 
There is no evidence that there was any fixed or 
agreed price in advance for any of these extra items. 
Plaintiff testified that defendant or his wife requested 
that these extra items (additions or .alterations) be 
put in; that he put them in, and the reasonable ancl 
fair price for same. Plaintiff's testimony is not dis-
puted. Under said facts, appellant submits that he 
could not be classified a.s a contractor under the above 
statute, nor held to be sueing as a contractor., so far 
as the present case is concerned, for the amount due 
for said extra. work is all that is involved in case at 
bar. 
Hence, we submit there was no necessity for t1'r 
court to decide the question whether or not the plain-
tiff was a contractor, or whether he had a contractor's 
license. Those questions were immaterial so far as 
the case at bar is concerned ; since plaintiff is not 
sueing as a contractor, as that term is defined bv 
statute. Hence the court erred in holding that the 
plaintiff was sueing as a contractor and in dismissing 
plaintiff's case upon the ground that plaintiff had not 
alleged that he held a contractor's licens8 at the time. 
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(3a) ~-\ppellant further submits that the court 
erred in holding that plaintiff did not have a con-
tractor's license at the time the contract was signed. 
It is true that the contract is dated at the top as of 
March 20, 1946, and that the letter from the State 
Department of Registration (to which we stipulated). 
stated that plaintiff's license was issued to him March 
:22, two days later. But plaintiff testified that the 
contract was not signed until several days after the 
date it b~ars. This testim.ony is not contradicted. 
Plaintiff also testified that his license had been issued 
to him at the time the contract was signed. That 
testimony also stands uncontradicted. 
That testimony of the plaintiff,-that the contract 
was actually signed some time,-"several days"-
after the date it bears. (Tr. 53). and that his license 
had been issued to hi.m before that contract was 
signed, should have been accepted by the court. for 
there is no evidence to the contrary. 
Yet the trial judge, (after he had sent the jury 
out), contrary to said definite and undisputed testi-
mony of plaintiff.- that he had his license at the 
time the contract was signed,- arbitrarily decided 
that plaintiff had not shown that he was the holder 
of a contractor's license at the time the contract was 
signed, and dismissed plaintiff's case for said reason. 
(3b) Appellant further contends that the trial 
court also erred in dismissing plaintiff's case on ac-
count of the implied finding that plaintiff did not hold 
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a contractor's license at the time the contract was 
performed. Even exclusive of plaintiff's testimony, 
the evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff did have 
his license while he carried out and performed the said 
contract, and as well as while said extra work was 
being done. 
This evidence was supplied by the defendant. The 
letter from the State Department of Registration, to 
which we stipulated, stated plaintiff's license was is-
sued to him March 22, 1946, two days after the date 
of the contract. The license was issued for and cov-
ered the yPar 1946. Hence there can be no question 
but that plaintiff did have his license at the time he 
actually Pngaged in the business or actually acted in 
the capacity of a contractor, and that is all that the 
statute requires. 
Vve do not believe that any fine could be assessed 
or imposed against the plaintiff for a violation of the 
statute, (doing work as a contractor without a 
license) for merely signing a contract, if no actual 
construction work was ever undertaken; nor until 
actual construction work was engaged in by the con-
tractor. If that be correct, then the important time 
when the contractor must have his license, under the 
statute, (before a penalty could be imposed), is the 
time when hP. actually undertakes to perform the work 
in question for which a license is required. As we 
have noted, the plaintiff not only testified that he 
had his license during said period, but the admitted 
evidence from the State Department of. Registration 
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show that the license was issued to him two days 
after the date of the contract, which would thus con-
clusively show that plaintiff had· his license while the 
work was being done. In addition to that, we have 
shown that plaintiff also testified that he had his 
license at the time when the contract was actually 
signed. \Ye have also shown that the necessity of a 
contractor's license to plaintiff does not 'apply in case 
at bar, so far as the present suit is concerned, for 
that is an action on quantum merit for the extra 
work and materials supplied at the defendant's 
request. 
For each and all of the above and foregoing 
reasons, we submit that the court below made gross 
error in dismissing the plaintiff's case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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